By Alon Ben-Meir and Arbana Xharra
The six Western Balkan countries —Serbia, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania, are “state
captured” by corrupt politicians, linked with organized crime. These facts have
been documented by various international reports, which are raising major
concerns among EU officials on the enlargement process.
These countries are expected to meet social,
political, and human rights standards as fundamental qualifications for joining
the EU. The EU, however, is becoming increasingly doubtful that the Balkan
countries can meet these standards, as their social and political life is
deeply beset by corruption. Nevertheless, the efforts to eradicate corruption
must not stop because Balkan membership in the EU serves the geostrategic
interests of both sides.
Cornelia Abel, Transparency International’s
Southeast Europe expert, said prior to the publication of its latest corruption
index that the connection between politicians and businesses or organized crime
“endangers, or in some cases even suspends to a large extent, the rule of law
and the division of power.” The European Union’s foreign policy chief Federica
Mogherini has pressed leaders to do more to fight corruption, but to no avail.
Lavdim Hamidi, the Editor-in-Chief of Kosovo’s
newspaper Zeri, who investigated corruption in the Balkans, says that “The
Balkan states undoubtedly are at the top of the list of the most corrupt countries
in the world.”
The 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index highlights
that the majority of the Balkan countries are making little or no progress in
ending corruption. Journalists and activists in these countries are risking
their lives every day in their effort to expose corrupt leaders. The index
ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of political
corruption, with 1 being the least and 180 the most corrupt.
Of all the Balkan counties, Macedonia is most
corrupt, ranked 107th. Two months ago, Macedonian ex-Prime Minister Nikola
Gruevski sought asylum in Hungary over a wire-tapping scandal for which the
court found him guilty. Xhemal Ahmeti, an expert on Balkan political affairs,
says that Macedonia and other Balkan countries are the same as in Nigeria or
anywhere else corruption takes place behind the mask of tribal, family, clan,
and ethnic ties.
“The ‘elites’ in these countries” says Ahmeti,
“have always been at work to convince their publics that they are mistakenly
accused of corruption by Westerners.” Accordingly, the EU and international
observers in Macedonia will not succeed in fighting corruption without direct
and active monitoring on the ground.
Kosovo is the second most corrupt country in the
Balkans, ranked 85th. Since it declared its independence in 2008, Kosovo has
provided many opportunities for its political leaders to become extremely rich.
“No matter where they served, all seemed to be profiting considerably more than
their wages shows. High level party officials became so rich they could afford
to hire personal drivers and bodyguards without declaring the source of
financing,” says Jeton Zulfaj, who spent the last two decades in Kosovo
focusing on anti-corruption strategies.
In Kosovo, where unemployment reached an alarming
figure of 30%, politicians are the richest class in the country. Many big
businesses have greatly expanded thanks to politicians’ support, who receive
millions in return for “their efforts.”
According to the corruption index, Albania fell
from 83rd to 91st place. Progress was made in tackling petty corruption in the
public sector, but much work must still be done, especially on corruption in
the judiciary. Gjergj Erebaja, a journalist from Albania, says that “The
justice system, including the prosecutors and the courts, are under extreme
influence of the political elite. Politicians… use unlimited power of the state
to blackmail voters… Large private businesses are, to some extent, an extension
of the political system.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina made no progress in
fighting corruption in the past decade, ranking the same as Albania. In this
country, political corruption at all levels of government remains a serious
concern. British Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Matt Field, has recently
written on corruption, stating:
The final cost of corruption is
harder to total, but it includes millions in corrupt government spending, in
stolen funds, and in missed foreign investments. And this price is always
the taxpayer, the citizen, who does not receive the quality public
services for which they pay.
Transparency International official Cornelia
Abel named Serbia as an example of a “captured political system”, citing the
excessive influence of its President, Aleksandar Vucic. “Serbia … is becoming a
prime example of one person in the position of power influencing everyone
else,” she said. Serbia fell by five places on the Corruption Perception Index,
from 72 in 2016 to 77 in 2017.
The Business Anti-Corruption Portal, supported
by the European Union, states that “Corruption is a problem in Serbia, and the
prevalence of bribery exceeds the regional average. Foreign companies should be
aware of conflicts of interest within Serbia’s state institutions. Government
procurement, natural resource extraction, and the judiciary are especially
vulnerable to fraud and embezzlement.”
Montenegro also has made little to no progress
in its fight against corruption, and it remains at 64th place. Transparency
International experts said that the 2016 alleged coup attempt only “stopped
anti-corruption efforts to some extent”. Montenegro is often criticized for not
doing enough to tackle organized crime and corruption, with Brussels demanding
concrete results in fighting corruption at the high political level as one of
the main conditions for the country to join the EU.
The endemic political corruption of the Balkan
states is certainly one of the main obstacles which is dramatically slowing the
process of integration into the EU. Given, however, that the Balkan states are
eager to join the EU, and since the EU is interested in luring them to its
orbit and distancing them from Turkey and Russia, both sides need to take
specific measures to address the problem of corruption.
The EU is in a strong position to use its
leverage by offering investments, loans, and access to the European market,
against which neither Russia nor Turkey can compete effectively—nonetheless,
they are stopping short of nothing to incorporate them into their sphere of
influence. In return, the Balkans should be required to institute political,
economic, and social reforms.
The EU should also insist on greater
transparency and accountability, which would curtail pervasive corruption by
elected officials. To that end, the EU should resume a law enforcement and
justice presence not only in Kosovo (which recently ended after ten years), but
in all the Balkan states who wish to become EU members.
Civil societies throughout the Balkans have a
major role to play by protesting and holding massive rallies and demanding an
end to the corruption that has infected all government strata, including the
judiciary and law enforcement. Should their respective governments fail to take
clear and decisive steps to deal with corruption, the public may have to resort
to civil disobedience, which could include labor strikes, student walkouts, and
a slowdown by government employees.
Addressing the problem of corruption in the
Balkans is central to the EU’s geostrategic interests as well as the Balkans’
future wellbeing within the EU community. The Balkans’ accession to the EU must
be a marriage of necessity that will dramatically enhance their collective
security while substantially improving the quality of life and respect for
human rights throughout the Balkans.
